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This paper empirically examines India's economic growth experience during 1960-2004, focusing
on the post 1973 acceleration.  Careful attention is paid to data quality.  The analysis focuses on two
unusual dimensions of India's experience -- the concentration of growth in services production, and
the modest levels of human and physical capital accumulation.  A growth accounting analysis disaggregates
by major sector, and highlights implications for aggregate productivity growth of the reallocation of
resources out of agriculture to more productive activities in industry and services.  But concerns are
raised that growth in services may be overstated.  India will need to broaden its current expansion
to provide manufactured goods for the world market and jobs for its large pool of low-skilled workers.
 Increased public saving, as well as a rise in foreign saving -- particularly FDI -- could augment the
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Recent years have witnessed a growing optimism about the potential for Indian 
economic growth.  In part, this is fueled by the example of strong sustained growth in 
China, raising the obvious question of why India cannot do as well.  However, the 
optimism also reflects the fact that India’s growth has accelerated over the past two 
decades.  And while its growth rate remains well below that of China, this favorable 
performance contrasts with the slowing of growth in other regions.  It has also enabled 
the emergence of a significant middle class in India.  Interestingly, India’s economic 
performance has differed from that of China and other parts of Asia in at least two 
dimensions.  First, India’s success has not been based on strong growth in the 
manufacturing sector and in exports.  Instead, it has reflected very rapid expansion of 
service-producing industries.  Second, it has been associated with relatively modest levels 
of investment.  Even incorporating recent data revisions, India’s physical capital 
accumulation has not been impressive.  And despite substantial increases in the number 
of Indians attaining higher education, illiteracy rates remain high.   
In this paper, we build on a growth accounting framework to empirically examine 
these dimensions of India’s recent growth.  Where has the growth been concentrated, as 
among agriculture, industry, and the service-producing sectors?  What are the major 
contributors to that growth: increased employment, capital per worker, educational 
attainment, or improvements in the basic efficiency of resource use (total factor 
productivity)?  We also examine each of the features noted above that distinguish India’s 
recent performance.   Thus, we are particularly interested in the sources of growth in the 
service-producing industries.  Is it sustainable or should India place greater emphasis on   2
the manufacturing sector and the promotion of rapid growth in export markets?  We also 
emphasize the roles of both physical and human capital accumulation.  Throughout the 
analysis, we are particularly concerned about the quality of the available statistical data, 
and the influence this may have on our conclusions.   
There is already an extensive empirical literature – often using growth accounts –
that examines these and other aspects of India’s economic growth.  Many of the studies 
address one or more of the following topics.  First, a number of analysts have focused on 
characterizing India’s economic performance at the most aggregate level.  While there is 
agreement that growth did indeed improve during the past quarter century, researchers 
have reached varying conclusions on some issues such as the timing and precise 
magnitude of this acceleration, and the relative importance of changes in domestic policy.  
For example, Virmani (1997),  Rodrik and Subramanian (2005) and Kohli (2006a and b) 
point out that growth initially accelerated during the 1980s, predating the reforms that 
followed the crisis of the early 1990s.  Within this context, Rodrik-Subramanian and 
Kohli  both stress the role of what they term “pro-business” reforms that began in the 
early 1980s.  In contrast, Srinivasan (2003b) and Panagyria (2004) argue that, prior to the 
more substantial liberalizations that emerged in the 1990s, growth was built largely on 
unsustainable increases in public expenditures and excessive foreign borrowing that 
culminated in the balance of payments crisis of 1991.  There are on-going discussions 
over the extent to which the current growth can be maintained and various means by 
which it might be increased.   
Second, analysts have examined the behavior of particular output sectors.  A 
number of authors have studied productivity in manufacturing – reaching a wide range of 
conflicting conclusions.  However, as explained in detail by Goldar and Mitra (2002), 
differences in the findings can be attributed to a variety of measurement issues, such as 
the use of singe versus double deflation to construct estimates of real growth in 
manufacturing value added.  Goldar (2004) provides a careful recent update showing that 
TFP growth in manufacturing appears to have slowed in the post reform period – raising 
additional puzzles discussed below.  (These two papers provide additional references to 
the relevant work.)  However, due to difficulties in measuring employment within 
individual industries, our analysis focuses primarily on the broader industrial sector.  The   3
studies that focus on India’s services sector (many of which discuss the issue of 
sustainability), and those that discuss agriculture, are discussed in the body of the paper. 
Given the large body of prior research, many of the results to be discussed below 
are already well-known to those in the field.  None-the-less, this paper seeks to make a 
contribution to that literature in a variety of ways.  In particular, the growth accounting 
framework, combined with our emphasis on data issues, pulls together concerns that have 
typically been treated separately, and in some cases, raise implications that do not appear 
to have been consistently recognized.   Our updated growth accounts incorporate recent 
data revisions, some of which are quite large.  They also provide new estimates for the 
contributions to overall growth of labor productivity growth within the major economic 
sectors versus the gains from reallocation of labor and capital among the factors.  
Furthermore, we have examined a variety of additional data in our analysis of the role of 
capital accumulation – providing estimates of the returns to schooling for human capital, 
and reporting on trends in sectoral saving and investment, for physical capital. 
Thus, this paper is comprised of four remaining sections.  The next section details 
the construction of growth accounts for India, with considerable attention paid to the 
quality of the underlying data.  The following section presents and discusses the results.  
Section three examines a range of issues related to the role of capital accumulation in 
India’s growth experience.  It focuses first on human capital and then turns to an analysis 
of investment and saving behavior in India.  Drawing from the preceding analyses, the 
final section discusses implications for Indian economic growth, going forward. 
We argue that the emphasis on business services as the driving force behind the 
expansion of the Indian economy is frequently overstated.  Despite its extraordinary 
growth, the industry comprises only a small share of India’s GDP and overall 
employment.  Instead, high rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the overall 
services sector, which includes such industries as trade, transportation and education 
where we would not expect to observe rapid TFP growth, raise concerns that growth of 
the sector may be overstated in the statistics.  In addition, business services provide jobs 
primarily for the relatively small proportion of the workforce that is highly educated.  We 
find some evidence that the current emphasis on high-skill services is already 
encountering some shortages -- a bidding up of the relative wage rate for secondary and   4
university-level graduates.  In any case, the expansion is not creating adequate job growth 
for the bulk of the Indian population that is not particularly well-educated. 
Thus, India would benefit from broadening the base of the current expansion by 
promoting programs that would increase India’s attractiveness as a source of 
manufactured goods for the world market.  The growth of the manufacturing sector 
would provide a strong match for the skills of the Indian workforce. This would require 
more urgent attention to improving the infrastructure in the areas of energy reliability, 
transportation and port facilities. 
India also faces significant challenges in the quality of the educational system.  As 
we illustrate, the Indian workforce is not particularly well-educated.  Illiteracy rates are 
high by international standards, even among the young, and we find evidence of 
shortages among the group of highly-educated workers (university graduates) who have 
done so well in recent years.  This suggests that India needs to expand the supply of well-
educated workers at the same time that it increases the demand for workers with more 
modest skills. 
Furthermore, we conclude that the supply of private saving in India is adequate to 
support a significantly higher rate of growth in future years.  From the perspective of 
physical capital formation, the problems are more concentrated in the extreme dissaving 
of the public sector and the apparent weakness to the demand side to expand investment.  
 
Construction of the Growth Accounts 
Although empirical research on productivity growth has used a variety of 
methodologies, most of the analysis has evolved along two primary paths: growth 
accounting or direct econometric estimation.  Both are based on the underlying concept 
of an aggregate production function.  Growth accounting combines the production 
function with the assumption of competitive markets, leading to the usage of income 
shares to measure the contribution of factor inputs.  This method focuses on identifying 
contributions of individual factor inputs and a residual, typically called total factor 
productivity (TFP).  In contrast, the econometric approach avoids any assumption that 
markets are competitive, and focuses on exploring alternative functional forms for the 
production function.   5
Most empirical studies have tended to emphasize what might be labeled the 
proximate causes of growth: measuring the quantity and quality of capital and labor 
inputs, and viewing the TFP residual as representing a combination of changes in 
efficiency and the production technology.  More recently, some researchers have sought 
to go beyond proximate causes, so as to associate the fundamental sources of long-term 
differences in living standards with underlying differences in institutional and legal 
arrangements and geography.  In these studies, TFP is perceived as the driving force 
behind growth.  Accumulation of both physical capital and labor skills is taken to be 
largely endogenous -- and ultimately induced by changes in TFP.  From this perspective, 
developing a theory of TFP is a central objective.
1    
    
Basic Growth Accounting Framework. 
Building from the seminal work by Solow (1957), modern productivity analysis 
begins with the concept of an aggregate production function.  As shown in equation (1), 
this relates output (Q) to contributions of factor inputs, capital (K) and labor (L), as well 
as a Hicks-neutral shift in the production function (A): 
 (1)    ( ) t t t t L K F A Q , = . 
The next step is to combine the notion of a production function with the 
assumption of competitive markets in which factors are paid their marginal products.  It 
is then straight-forward to derive a simple index number formulation relating growth in 
output to increases in factor inputs and a residual shift term, identified with TFP: 
 (2)  TFP L d s K d s Q d l k ln ) ln( ) ln( ln Δ + + = ,  
where sk and sl are the shares of capital and labor income, respectively.
2   
As discussed more fully below, it is often difficult to obtain meaningful time 
series estimates of factor income shares.  Thus, many studies adopt the more restricted 
                                                 
1 Examples of this literature are provided by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Easterly and Levine 
(2001).  
2 The use of income share weights is critical, because this makes it possible to avoid imposing restrictions 
on the possible functional forms of the production function.  In empirical applications, the factor shares are 
replaced by average between period shares in a Tornqvist discrete time approximation.  Thus sk is replaced 
by (skt + skt-1 ) / 2 .  A summary of this literature is provided in Hulten (2001).  OECD (2001) provides a 
detailed manual, elaborating on the major issues.   6
Cobb-Douglas production function, which assumes the contribution of each factor to be 
constant: 
 (3)  ()
γ α α − =
1
t t t L K A Q . 
Again, A represents TFP and γ measures the extent of returns to scale.  In this restricted 
formulation, the sk and sl of equation (2) are replaced with constants.  Many studies have 
also simply assumed returns to scale of unity. In the absence of an explicit allowance, 
returns to scale are subsumed within an overall residual of TFP.  That is the approach 
used in this study. 
It has become standard to adjust the factor inputs, particularly labor, to reflect 
changes in quality.  Most of this research follows one of two common approaches.  The 
first seeks to cross-classify the workforce by a number of differentiating characteristics, 
such as education, age, occupation and gender.   Information on these characteristics is 
combined with data on wage rates, so to compute each subgroup’s share of total 
compensation, vi.  An adjusted measure of the labor input is then computed as  
 (4)  i
i
i L d v L d ln ln
* ∑ =  
However, this process is very data intensive.  In addition, some analysts object that 
observed wage differentials may reflect factors other than productivity differences, such 
as gender or age discrimination. 
The alternative is to use a simple index of educational attainment to adjust for 
skill differences.  For example, an index of the form: 
 (5)  L e L
as =
*  
assumes that each year of schooling, s, raises the average worker’s productivity by a 
constant percentage, a.  This formulation has a ready parallel with the vast number of 
empirical studies that have measured the relationship between wages and years of 
schooling using “Mincer regressions”.   Such studies have been carried out for different 
time periods and for a large number of countries around the world, typically finding a 
return to each additional year of education in the range of 7 to 12 percent.
3  
                                                 
3 References to many of these international studies are available in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004).  
We will discuss several specific studies of India in a later section.   7
Quality adjustments can also be made to the measure used for capital input --  
however, in most cases these are more properly identified as reflecting changes in the 
composition of the capital stock.  Current approaches were developed from Jorgenson’s 
neoclassical investment theory that clarified the distinction between the capital stock and 
capital services.  Using his concept of user cost, the rental price of capital services is 
given by   
 (6)  k k
s
k P P i P • − + = ) ( & δ , 
 where i represents the rate of return, and δ the rate of depreciation.   k P  and  k P &  are the 
price of a unit of capital, and its rate of change, respectively.  This formulation makes it 
clear that the flow of capital services will vary with difference in the rate of capital asset 
depreciation.  Assuming that the real rate of return is constant across asset classes, the 
capital service term can be used to compute capital income shares.  In a fashion 
analogous to equation (4), these shares can then be used to aggregate capital of different 
service lives, thereby constructing an adjusted capital input measure.  The growing 
importance of short-lived, high-tech capital has made the issue of compositional changes 
in the capital stock more important.   
Unfortunately, few countries have sufficiently detailed information to make these 
types of compositional adjustments to their capital inputs measure – and India is no 
exception.  The data constraints are particularly acute at the level of individual industries.  
Instead, an estimate of the capital stock is commonly used as the index of capital services.  
The essential difference between the two is that the capital stock aggregate is constructed 
using purchase prices as the relevant weights, while the capital services aggregate would 
be constructed using rental prices as weights. 
  Using this framework, we estimate a set of growth accounts over the period 1960-
61 to 2004-05, for the total economy as well as for its three major sectors -- agriculture, 
industry and services – as well as for manufacturing.
4  We have excluded residential 
housing from services and the total economy because income from housing is based 
                                                 
4  We follow the grouping traditionally used by the UN and other international organizations.  Indian 
statistical agencies use the same grouping, but refer to them as the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. 
The agricultural sector includes forestry and fishing.  Industry is comprised of mining, manufacturing, 
construction and utilities.  The services sector covers the remainder of the economy.   8
solely on imputations, and is all assigned to capital income.  As described more fully 
below, the output and capital stock data are from the national accounts.  These reflect the 
significant revisions associated with the adoption of the new 1999-00 base.  Estimates of 
employment are based on results from the quinquennial household surveys. 
 
Data Sources 
  The Indian statistical agencies face substantial challenges in preparing measures 
of output and employment at both the aggregate and sectoral levels.  The difficulties arise 
primarily because a large portion of the nonagricultural workforce operates outside of 
standard reporting programs.  Furthermore, India’s national accounts are highly 
dependent on a series of quinquennial surveys for information on households and small 
enterprises.   Therefore, annual estimates of output and employment (as well as estimates 
at higher frequencies), are largely based on either simple interpolations or on 
extrapolations of underlying source data.  We have relied heavily on the comprehensive 
analysis of Sivasubramonian (2004) for the development of the requisite data at the level 
of the total economy.  We have extended his analysis by incorporating recent revisions of 
the national accounts and by developing comparable growth accounts for major sub-
sectors of the Indian economy (agriculture, industry, manufacturing, and services).  We 
have also incorporated an alternative methodology to estimate the contribution of 
improvements in the educational attainment of the workforce. 
In the remainder of this section, we discuss the data used to construct growth 
accounts for India.  Output measures are considered first, followed by each of the factor 
inputs and, finally, measures of factor shares.  Along the way, we summarize key data 
concerns and their implications.    
 
Output.  India has a reasonably good statistical system for measuring output of 
the agricultural sector and of non-agricultural enterprises that participate in government 
reporting programs, and are classified as part of the organized sector.
5  For example, this 
                                                 
5 A recent review of the Indian statistical system is provided in the 2001 Report of the National Statistical 
Commission, available at: http://mospi.nic.in/nscr/mp.htm.  The commission identified some significant 
areas of deterioration in the agricultural and industry statistics, and it highlighted the dearth of information 
about service-producing industries.    9
includes factories registered under the 1948 Factories Act, as well as large portions of 
mining, utilities, communications and finance.  For these enterprises, it is possible to 
construct estimates of value added for national accounts, using either the production 
approach or the income approach.  Furthermore, original source data are often available 
annually. 
  However, most workers are not included within the organized or formal sector of 
the economy.  This point is clearly illustrated in Table 1, which provides data for 1999-
2000.  Its first three columns show the distribution of GDP by major industry, as well as 
the share of output in each industry produced in the organized versus the unorganized 
sectors.
6  The final column shows the percent of employment that is unorganized in each 
sector.
7   Within the nonagricultural economy, for example, fully 44 percent of the GDP 
was in the unorganized sector, and unorganized employment accounted for 88 percent of 
total employment.   
For the unorganized sector, Indian measures of GDP are constructed using the 
labor input method.  Thus, estimates of labor input at the industry level are combined 
with measures of value added per worker (VAPW) from a variety of enterprise surveys. 
In this context, it is important to note that labor input is defined in terms of the number of 
jobs, not the number of workers.  The total labor input measure comes from the 
quinquennial household survey.  Since the objective is to obtain an employment measure 
equivalent to the one that employers would report (inclusive of multiple job holding), the 
number of workers reporting a principal employment activity over the prior year is added 
to the number of workers reporting a subsidiary employment activity.  Each worker could 
be recorded as having up to two jobs.  No adjustment is made for full versus part-time 
work for either primary or secondary jobs.
8   The measure of labor input in the organized 
                                                 
6 The unorganized sector is a bit broader than the related concept of the informal sector.  For further 
discussion of the classification issues in the Indian context see Saha, Kar,and Baskaran (2004) and Kolli 
and Hazra (2005).   
7 Note that the percent of employment in a particular industry that is unorganized may differ from the share 
of labor input to the unorganized sector.  For example, labor inputs in the organized sector may include 
casual workers, who would be classified as “unorganized employment”. 
8 The methods used to compute the labor input have varied significantly over time, further restricting the 
comparability of the estimates of industry value added.  The 1950, 1970, and 1980 benchmarks used census 
estimates, whereas the 1993-94 and 1999-00 benchmarks used data from the quinquennial employment and 
unemployment surveys.  The 1970 through 1990 censuses are known to have encountered severe problems   10
sector is obtained from employer reports.  Thus, labor input in the unorganized sector is 
simply a residual -- the difference between the two.  
The techniques described above should generate reasonably good estimates of 
output in the benchmark years for which survey data are available.  However, India has 
no consistent source of information about employment in the unorganized sector for the 
years between the quinquennial surveys.  Annual information on value added per worker 
is equally limited, since the value-added data are also updated on an approximate 5-year 
cycle.  Therefore, detailed calculations of output using the labor input method can only be 
undertaken for benchmark years.  Estimates of value added for the years between 
benchmarks are obtained by interpolation.  Estimates for years since the most recent 
benchmark are obtained by extrapolating the labor inputs, based on growth between the 
two most recent benchmarks. 
 Table 2 provides a stark illustration of the problems created by the lack of 
underlying annual survey data for the unorganized portions of the economy.   The first 
column shows the sectoral composition of GDP, using the revised data.  The next two 
columns show two estimates of 1993-94 GDP – one using the 1980-81 benchmark and 
the other from the 1993-94 benchmark revision.  Column 4 shows the percentage 
difference between the two.   The second panel provides parallel information for 1999-
2000 GDP, comparing the estimate using the 1993-94 benchmark, with the revision from 
the 1999-00 benchmark.   (We note that, prior to the introduction of the 1993-94 base, 
GDP data were rebased to the decennial census with the last benchmark being 1980.  The 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) has now shifted to a procedure that ties benchmark 
revisions to the quinquennial household surveys.)  
As shown in the fourth column of Table 2, revisions to 1993-94 GDP were 
substantial, raising the estimate of total GDP by fully 9 percent.   In part, the sizable 
revisions that accompanied the shift to the 1993-94 base reflect the fact that it had been 
so many years since the introduction of the 1980-81 base.  But it is important to point out 
that the revisions are quite small for those industries that are largely in the organized 
sector and for which annual sources of information are available.  In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in measuring the workforce (Visaria, 2002).  Also the 1999-00 benchmark adjusted for multiple jobs at the 
level of individual industries, whereas the 1993-94 estimates relied on common ratios from aggregate data.  
Additional details are available in CSO (2004).    11
necessity of relying on the labor input methodology and past rates of change to 
extrapolate output resulted in particularly large output revisions in the service-producing 
industries (15 percent, on average).  Output for the category that includes business 
services was revised upwards by 103 percent. The lack of good output data for the service 
industry is a problem in all countries.  It is of particular importance for India because of 
the prominent role that services are expected to play in the country’s future growth. 
The 1999-00 base revisions, shown in column 8, were much smaller – both 
because fewer years had elapsed and because there had been fewer methodological 
changes.  In addition, India adopted many elements of the 1993 Standard National 
Accounts, which contributed to some of the upward revisions of GDP.  The revisions for 
agriculture and industry were minor, but output of the service-producing industries was 
increased by 4.5 percent, adding almost a percentage point to the annual growth rate.  
And once again, the revisions were quite large in some sub-sectors, such as the category 
including business services. 
The problems with annual output estimates in non-benchmark years suggest that 
debates over the precise timing of changes in India’s rate of GDP growth around episodes 
of economic reform should not be taken very seriously.  Annual changes, based on 
extrapolations from the last benchmark, may be misleading.  In contrast, the benchmark 
estimates themselves are constructed with considerable detail and a strong anchor in the 
quinquennial surveys.  This provides a reasonable degree of confidence for focusing on 
those selected years to study India’s economic performance.   
In the past, The CSO has provided revised historical estimates of GDP and its 
components that are consistent with the latest benchmark.  However, similar data have 
not yet been published following the introduction of the new 1999-00 base.  In the 
absence of published data, we have assumed that the percentage revision of 1999-00 
reflected a drift in the annual estimates and distributed this discrepancy back to 1993-94 
in a linear fashion. We continue to measure output in 1993-94 prices.  The output data of 
1993-94 and earlier years are assumed to be unchanged.
9 
 
                                                 
9 This procedure closely follows the description by the CSO for its revisions of the historical data after the 
1993-94 revisions.   12
Capital Stock Estimates.  Estimates of the capital stock by industry are available 
back to 1950.  However, these are dependent on the underlying measures of investment 
by industry, and there is little direct information on capital service lives.  The CSO 
compiles two separate estimates of capital investment.  First, aggregate investment by 
asset type is based largely on a commodity-flow method.  Second, investment by industry 
is compiled from establishment surveys, which do not have asset detail.  The two 
estimates have differed substantially in some years.  We have used the industry-based 
estimates because we need estimates of the capital stock by broad industry groups. 
 The annual estimates of investment are subject to similar uncertainties between 
benchmark years as those discussed above with regarding output data.  Again, the 
problems are most evident in the published revisions at the time a new base year is 
adopted.  The 1993-94 benchmark revisions increased total investment of all industries 
by a relatively modest 9 percent.
10  Somewhat surprisingly, the changes associated with 
the shift to the 1999-00 base are much more substantial -- despite the passage of just 5 
years since the prior benchmark.  Total industry fixed investment in 1999-00 has been 
increased by 33 percent, with revisions for agriculture, industry and services of 57, 17, 
and 46 percent respectively.
11   
The recent investment revisions are sufficiently large to have a major effect on 
estimates of growth in capital stocks since 1993-94.  Since official capital stock revisions 
are not yet available, we have created new estimates for the major economic sectors, and 
for manufacturing, for the period of 1993-94 to 2004-05.  As with output, we have phased 
in the investment revisions beginning in 1993-94.  For the capital stocks, we created 
approximate measures using a fixed geometric rate of depreciation.  These approximate 
measures were then recomputed for the period after 1993-94, using both the old and the 
revised estimates of investment.  The percent adjustment for each year was applied to the 
corresponding official series to obtain our final revised capital stock series.  For 2004-05, 
                                                 
10 At the sector level, the percentage adjustments were -6 percent for agriculture, 18 percent for Industry, 
and 4 percent for services (Central Statistical Office, 1999, pp. 39-40). 
11 CSO (2006), table 30, p. 53.  The revisions to the commodity-flow estimates were much smaller, but the 
methodology was changed to bring the industry estimates into line with those based on the commodity flow 
method.    13
the last year of published data, our methodology implies that the revisions increased the 
overall capital stock by 15 percent, with even larger increases for agriculture and services. 
 
Land Input Estimates.   Our growth accounts include land as well as capital and 
labor as factor inputs to produce agriculture.  An estimate of the volume of land used in 
agricultural production is available annually (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 
2005).  However, there are no available estimates of current market value of the land that 
would enable us to construct measures of the annual flow of capital services.  We use an 
estimate of total cropped land that adjusts for irrigated lands, sown more than once per 
year. 
 
Employment.  Difficulties also arise in the effort to construct reliable annual 
estimates of employment, and thus labor productivity. The censuses of 1971, 1981, and 
1991 are believed to have produced solid estimates of the overall population, but they 
grossly underestimated the worker-population ratio (WPR) and thus the size of the total 
workforce.  Visaria (2002) discusses these problems and suggests the need for corrections 
on the order of 26 (1971), 15 (1981) and 12 (1991) percent to the reported figures.
12  In 
contrast, the quinquennial surveys appear to yield consistent estimates of WPRs, but to 
underestimate the total population.  Thus, estimates of India’s labor force are typically 
generated by combining the survey-based estimates of the WPR for four component 
groups (rural men, rural women, urban men and urban women) with estimates of the 
corresponding populations, obtained from interpolating the census data.  As a result, 
reliable estimates of the total workforce are limited to the years covered by the six 
quinquennial household surveys that were conducted over the period of 1972-73 to 1999-
2000.  Annual estimates for the aggregate economy can only be obtained by 
interpolations and extrapolations of the results from those surveys.
13 
                                                 
12 Provisional estimates of the WPRs are available for the 2001 census.  The values appear to be much 
closer to the 1999-00 quinquennial survey than in past censuses. 
13 A recent evaluation of the potential usefulness of the smaller annual NSO surveys, which were 
undertaken in other years, is provided by Sundaram and Tendulkar (2005a).  They concluded that the 
WPRs are not sufficiently comparable with those of the quinquennial surveys.  Bhalla and Das (2006) reach 
a contrary conclusion.   14
The NSSO surveys incorporate several distinct measures of the economic 
activities of the population.  These are based on the prior year (usual status), the prior 
week (current weekly status) and each day of the reference week (daily status).  They also 
distinguish between the principle activity status (plurality of time) and subsidiary status.  
Most researchers have relied on a count of persons with employment in usual status 
(either principle or subsidiary).  However, unlike the national accounts their estimates are 
based on a count of persons, not a count of jobs.   Visaria (2002) used estimates of 
worker participation rates from the quinquennial surveys and interpolated estimates of the 
populations of rural and urban males and females to produce estimates of the workforce.  
Sivasubramonian (2004) interpolated those estimates to obtain annual data for the 
aggregate economy. 
We have updated the data of Visaria and Sivasubramonian using slightly different 
estimates of the WPRs by gender and sector from the NSSO surveys, and extended the 
estimates through 2004.  We also used information from the surveys to allocate 
employment among the sectors: agriculture, industry (and manufacturing), and services.  
The calculations are shown in appendix table 1.  The resulting estimates of employment 
apply to the seven years covered by surveys from 1973 to 2004.  We combined those 
observations with estimates from the 1961 Census, and interpolated the data to obtain 
annual measures of employment by sector for the period from 1960-61 to 2004-05.
14 
 These employment surveys also provide information about the highest level of 
educational attainment for individuals in the workforce.  These measures can be used to 
adjust the workforce for improvements in quality over time.  Thus, for constructing the 
growth accounts, we computed average years of schooling for workers over age 15 in the 
three sectors of agriculture, industry, and services. We assumed a 7 percent return for 
each year of schooling in constructing an index of labor quality as in equation (5).
15  
                                                 
14 The differences with the aggregate estimates of Sivasubramonian are small.  In addition, the 60
th round, 
conducted January – June, 2004, did not extend over a complete year; but when we compared the usual 
status WPRs for corresponding sub-rounds of the 55
th round, we found no evidence of seasonality.  We 
opted to use the estimates from the 60
th round until those from the 61
st (a quinquennial round) become 
available.  
15 As discussed later, returns to schooling in India seem comparable to international experience, and the 
assumption of a 7 percent return is consistent with our estimates for other countries (Bosworth and Collins, 
2003).    15





th rounds that enable us to compute estimates of the returns to education over 
the 1983-2004 period.  The analysis of the gains in educational attainment and their 
relationship to earnings are discussed more fully in a later section.   
 
Factor Incomes. The distribution of income payments between capital and labor 
is an important input into growth accounts because income shares, under conditions of 
competitive markets, can be used to measure the contributions of each factor without the 
need to rely on a specific functional form for the aggregate production function.  
However, such estimates are problematic for India (and most developing countries) 
because of the dominant role of the self-employed in total employment.  Their earnings, 
which are labeled as mixed income in the national accounts, reflect a combination of 
income from capital and their own labor.  In industrial countries, where the income of the 
self-employed is a small proportion of the total, it is common to impute a wage equal to 
that of their employees or a return on capital equal to that of the corporate sector.  
However, in the case of India, mixed income accounted for 45 percent of NDP in 2002-
03, and 79 percent of the income of the unorganized sector, which is a slowly declining 
share of the total economy (CSO, 2005, p. xlv).  The dominant role of mixed income 
raises strong doubts about the validity of the imputation technique for such a large 
income component.
16 
We have used fixed factor shares in our analysis. That implies a more restrictive 
range of production functions, but the analysis of industrial countries -- where 
information on factor income shares are available -- suggests little variation in share 
weights over time.  We have also assumed constant returns to scale in all three sectors -- 
any such gains are allocated to the TFP residual.  For agriculture, our assumed shares are 
0.5, 0.25, and 0.25 for labor, capital and land respectively.
17  For industry and services, 
                                                 
16 Sivasubramonian (2004) allocated mixed income between labor and capital on the basis of the 
distribution of income in the private organized sector.  The result is a labor share that declines from 55-60 
percent of GDP in the 1960s to 45-50 percent by the late 1990s. 
17 Evenson and others (1999, p. 40).  The values are an average of their results for 1967, 1977, and 1987.  
They included a weight for fertilizer; but because our data are based on valued added, we scaled up the 
estimates for the other inputs. A similar procedure was used to compute agricultural TFP in Bhattarai and 
Narayanmoorthy (2003).   16
we used a simple capital share of 0.4.  For the aggregate economy, we combined the 
factor shares of individual sectors, weighted by their share of total nominal nonresidential 
GDP.  The share of agriculture, for example, declines from 52 percent of the total in 
1960-61 to 23 percent in 2004-05.  We also conducted some sensitivity analysis using 
different values for the factor shares.  However, in the case of India, choice of specific 
shares has little impact on the analysis because, in general, there have been relatively 
small differences in the growth rates for the labor and capital inputs.  Thus, estimates of 
TFP are only marginally affected. 
 
India’s Growth Accounts: Results and Discussion 
  
In this section, we present our updated growth accounts -- first for the total 
economy and then by major sector.  The results reflect many of the now standard themes 
in the literature on India’s economic development.  However, some new findings emerge 
as well.   Thus, drawing implications from our results, we build on the existing literature 
to discuss some of the key issues for India’s growth experience and prospects for the 
future.  The basic growth accounts are provided for the aggregate economy in table 3 and 
by sector in table 4, and we refer to these data throughout the discussion. 
 
Aggregate Growth 
We begin by looking at growth performance over the relatively long periods 
1960-80 versus 1980-2004 (top panel of table 3).  This split reflects the widespread view 
that the performance of the Indian economy changed significantly around 1980.  
(However, as discussed above, there is an on-going debate about the role of economic 
reforms and the relative importance of changes undertaken during the 1980s versus those 
undertaken after the 1991 economic crisis.)   
The acceleration of GDP growth after 1980 is clearly evident in the top panel of 
table 3 -- from an average of 3.4 percent per year during the period from 1960-80 to 5.8 
percent during 1980-81 to 2004-05.  It is noteworthy that nearly all of the output growth 
during the first period is associated with increases in factor inputs.  However, the post-  17
1980 acceleration is concentrated in improvements in the efficiency of factor use, TFP.
18  
That the gains should be concentrated in TFP seems reasonable in light of the fact that the 
growth gains are typically attributed to shifts in the policy regime beginning around 1980 
– that initiated an ongoing process of liberalization and opening up of the economy.  The 
associated increases in reliance on markets and reductions in the role of government 
would be expected to result in improved economic efficiency.   
However, there has been little or no net gain in the rate of job growth, and only a 
modest pickup in the rate of growth of both physical and human (education) capital per 
worker.  As other authors have noted, this pattern is a striking contrast to that experienced 
by East Asian economies.  Their periods of rapid growth have been characterized by 
strong employment gains, significant capital deepening, and rapid increases in 
educational attainment.
19  We discuss India’s experience with both human and physical 
capital accumulation in greater detail in a following section. 
  We can also examine shorter periods by focusing on the intervals between the 
quinquennial surveys.  We argued above that data for these years are likely to be more 
reliable because the survey results are a primary input to the national accounts and 
provide the only direct measure of employment.  As shown in table 3, growth in output 
per worker strengthened from just 1.8 percent per annum in 1973-83 to 2.9 percent in 
1983-93 and 5.8 percent in 1993-99.   These figures seem to imply a sustained 
improvement in the underlying trend.  However, they do not enable us to pin down the 
precise timing of the growth acceleration.  Growth did slow over the 1999-04 period, but 
this appears largely due to a severe agricultural drought in 2003-04.  Moreover, 
preliminary data for 2005-06 suggest a strong 8.4 percent annual growth rate, and a three-
year average above 8 percent. 
  As discussed above, our measures of physical capital accumulation reflect the 
significant upward revisions to investment in the 1999-2000 benchmark.  We have 
phased these in to our capital stock estimates beginning in 1993-94.  The resulting 
contribution of increased capital per worker during 1993-99 of 2.4 percent per annum is 
                                                 
18 Previous studies have also concluded that growth in factor inputs accounted for most of the growth in 
output during the “pre-reform” period.  For example, see Dholokia (2002), who defines this earlier period 
as 1960-85. 
19 Bosworth and Collins (2003)   18
similar to levels observed during East Asia’s rapid growth periods.  However, India’s 
capital deepening appears not to have kept pace with employment growth after 1999.  
 
Agriculture 
   The growth accounts for the major sectors are shown in table 4.  The first panel 
summarizes the growth performance of the agricultural sector.  The contrast between the 
increase in labor productivity during 1960-80 (growth of just 0.1 percent per annum) 
versus 1980-2004 (1.8 percent per annum) highlights the role of the green revolution.  In 
fact, the new technology began to be implemented in the early to mid-1970s.  Our 
decomposition shows TFP growth jumping from -0.2 percent per year during 1960-73 to 
0.9 percent per year during 1973-83, and to 1.2 percent during 1983-99.  This estimated 
acceleration in TFP growth is consistent with a number of recent studies that focused on 
agriculture.
20 It also is coincident with other changes that expanded the role of private 
decision-makers. There has been some concern that the rate of improvement in 
agriculture has begun to moderate, possibly suggesting lower returns to the government’s 
R&D and extension service expenditures on the sector.  However, our results do not 
suggest such a pattern -- except for the most recent five year period which includes the 
drought.  There is still considerable margin, judged by the performance in comparator 
countries for improvements in agricultural yields. 
One surprise is that agricultural employment continues to grow.  The experience 
with similar stages of development in other countries has been that employment within 
agriculture tends to decline as underemployed workers are drawn out of agriculture into 
industry and services.  In this context, India’s experience is particularly notable because, 
as is well known, a relatively large share of India’s employment remains in agriculture.  





                                                 
20 See, for example, Coelli and Rao (2003), Everson and others (1999), Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) and 
Janaiah and others (2005). 
21 For example, see Virmani (2005) for one recent discussion of this point.   19
The second panel of table 4 shows that industrial output growth also quickened 
after 1980.  However, the magnitude of this increase was less than for the economy as a 
whole.  Employment growth rose by about 0.4 percentage points, to 3.5 percent per 
annum, while the contribution of capital per worker remained low, and the gains in 
educational attainment of the workforce have been modest.  Although all of the 
improvement in labor productivity can be traced to higher growth in TFP, this also 
remains low by international standards.  Further, the figures in Table 4 show TFP growth 
as slowing, not accelerating, during the post reform period.  These results are 
disappointing in light of the attention that has been devoted to the on-going liberalization 
of the trade and regulatory regimes for goods production.  However, they parallel the 
results of some other researchers, who also found somewhat disappointing performance 
of the industrial sector in recent decades.
22 
But a low rate of TFP growth in industry is not necessarily a surprise.  First, it 
was a common feature of the early stages of growth in other Asian countries (Young, 
1995).  Certainly, the industrial base is likely to be inefficient initially, providing some 
room for productivity gains.  But to the extent that developing country growth is a 
process of adopting the existing production technologies of more industrialized 
economies, longer-term gains in industrial sector TFP are likely to be minimal.   The 
requisite capital and technology are purchased in global markets, and then combined with 
an advantage in low-cost labor to produce an output that is sold in competitive global 
markets.  This is not a process that is likely to generate large productivity residuals – or 
large economic rents.  Any TFP gains are more likely to be found in the production of 
goods for the domestic market, as inefficient producers decline in importance.  At the 
aggregate level, gains in TFP will largely emerge from the shift of resources among the 
sectors. 
In any case, there remains considerable scope for growth of India’s industrial 
sector.  In particular, India’s employment share in industry remains surprisingly low 
given its development level.  Raising living standards will require expansion of relatively 
labor-intensive activities, so as to productively employ the large pool of low-skilled 
                                                 
22 Recent discussions include Wallack (2003) and Kohli (2006b).     20
workers who are currently under-employed in agriculture.
23 At its current stage of 
development, India’s priority is to generate employment in industry.  Less concern need 
be devoted to increases in sectoral TFP.  
Because much of the discussion of India’s economic growth has focused on 
manufacturing, we extracted it from the rest of the industrial sector and compiled a 
separate set of accounts.  Our data include both the registered and unregistered portions 
of manufacturing.
24  Together they account for roughly half of the industrial sector, but 
only about 15 percent of overall GDP.   As shown in the third panel of table 4, the 
general pattern of growth for manufacturing is very similar to that for total industry.   
Like industry, manufacturing shows a sharp acceleration of growth after 1983.  The 
investment boom of the mid-1990s and the subsequent collapse are also evident in the 
large change in the capital contribution before and after 1999-00. 
Manufacturing experienced the same slowing of TFP growth after 1993 that was 
reported for industry as a whole, but the improvement in the last 5 years is more 
pronounced.  The early and mid-1990s were marked by major reductions in industrial 
tariffs that intensified the competitive pressures on domestic manufacturing and mining.  
Thus, we would expect some initial reduction in TFP, but a steady pickup of growth as 
the old capital depreciates and new technologies are adopted by an increasing proportion 
of the industry.  The cycle appears to have been amplified by a significant buildup of 
excess capacity in the mid 1990s, leading to a sharp downturn in both output and capital 
accumulation at the end of the decade.  That excess capacity has been largely eliminated 
in recent years. 
It is notable that employment growth in manufacturing has been consistently 
slower than for industry overall, giving rise to somewhat faster rates of growth of both 
labor productivity and TFP.   However, the measure of TFP in manufacturing is sensitive 
to the precise factor share that is used to combine the inputs.  This is the one case in 
which the growth rates of capital and labor differ by a significant amount in some periods. 
                                                 
23 Many authors have made this point, including Banga (2005), Virmani (2005), and Krueger (2005). In this 
context, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) highlight the role of increased non-agricultural activity in rural 
areas for raising rural incomes. 
24 The registered portion has increased from 58 percent of the total in 1980 to about 65 percent today.    21
The general pattern of our results for the post-1993 period is comparable to the 
results reported in Goldar (2004).  However his study used data from the Annual Survey 
of Manufacturing (ASI), and it related only to the registered portion of manufacturing.  
Goldar also found that TFP growth slowed somewhat after 1991, but the analysis could 
only cover the years up to 2001-02, the last year for which ASI data are available.   
 
Services 
The bottom panel of table 4 summarizes the growth performance of the services 
sector.  As frequently noted, service-producing industries have been the primary source 
of India’s growth surge, consistently outperforming industry/manufacturing.
25  Indeed, 
since 1980, output growth has exceeded the pre-1980 growth rate by 2.7 percent per year 
-- and maintained an average annual growth of 7½ percent.  Furthermore, employment 
growth in the sector has averaged 3.6 percent per year, roughly comparable to that for 
industry.  However, increases in capital per worker have made an even smaller 
contribution to growth for services than for industry.   The result is that gains in output 
per worker are dominated by high rates of improvement in TFP, averaging nearly three 
percent annually.  We also note that this sector has registered the largest improvements in 
the educational attainment of its workforce.  
Another perspective on the role of TFP in India’s post-1980 growth is provided 
by figure 1, which displays annual TFP trends by sector and for the total economy.  The 
dominance of the service-producing industries and the relatively weak performance of the 
goods producers are both very evident.  The chart also shows that the growth of TFP in 
services has been remarkable consistent over the past quarter century and shows few 
signs of abating.   
The source of such strong TFP growth in services, however, is puzzling. 
Information on employment is not available at a sufficient level of detail to compute 
productivity indexes; but greater detail is available for the output measures.  Thus, table 5 
                                                 
25 Banga (2005) provides a recent overview of the issues associated with India’s rapid growth in services.  
He highlights explanations for and implications of the so-called “job-less growth” in India’s service sector 
whereby increases in the share of GDP have not been associated with equivalent increases in the share of 
employment.  Banga and Goldar (2004) argue that services are increasingly important as an input to Indian 
manufacturing. See also Gordon and Gupta (2004).  Srinivasan (2005) focuses specifically on the 
development of India’s IT sector and its implications for growth.   22
reports growth in the component industries and their contribution to the growth of the 
total (defined to exclude housing).  We have separated the sector into a modern 
component that includes communications, finance, business services, education and 
medical care, and a traditional sector of trade, transportation, public and personal services. 
Communications, finance and especially business services have received considerable 
attention as areas in which India has done well.  The middle panel shows that these sub-
sectors do indeed stand out, with high average rates of growth.  Yet, business services 
account for just 5 percent of the overall sector’s output, and the entire modern component 
accounted for less than half of the growth between 1980-81 and 2004-05.  Instead, the 
acceleration of the sector’s growth has been very broadly based, including trade, 
transportation, and community and personal services.  But these are not industries in 
which we would anticipate rapid productivity growth. As stressed by Baumol (1967) 
services are normally an area of limited productivity growth.  That characterization is 
changing with respect to portions of what we have called modern services because IT 
capital greatly altered the production process.  On the other hand, although services are a 
major IT user in the United States, the adoption of the capital has not been accompanied 
by supernormal returns that might spillover into TFP.
26  Education is another substantial 
sector in which we would not expect to observe significant productivity growth. 
 An alternative explanation is that increases in the price of services are being 
underestimated, leading to an overstatement of real growth.  However, this hypothesis is 
difficult to verify.  We can only note that while overall inflation has averaged about 7 
percent since 1980, it has been remarkably similar for agriculture, industry and services.  
From an international perspective, the finding of large TFP gains in the service industries 
is atypical.  Most countries, lacking measures of physical output, extrapolate the output of 
services with indexes of the inputs.
27  Thus by construction, they eliminate the possibility 
of reported productivity gains. This does not appear to be a common practice in the 
Indian national accounts.  While up-to-date information on the methods used to adjust for 
                                                 
26 Triplett and Bosworth (2005). 
27 The most common methods are to use an index of employment to represent real growth, or equivalently 
to deflate the nominal values by change in average wage rates.  In recent years, the U.S. and some other 
OECD countries have moved away from this input-based valuation by developing explicit price indexes for 
services.  However, the method is still used for government and education.    23
price inflation is limited, it appears that services output is often adjusted only for general 
(CPI) inflation (CSO, 1989).  In the case of trade, margins are assumed to be constant in 
real value and change in line with total sales.  Because so much of services lies outside 
the organized sector, the Indian statistical agencies have little or no direct information on 
the output of services.  To a large extent, they are forced to rely on extrapolation of the 
base year values. 
In summary, the growth of the service sector has been sustained and very broadly 
based.  However, the extent that it is concentrated in TFP and not employment does give 
us pause.  In addition, the lack of employment data at a more detailed level prevents us 
from exploring the source of the TFP gains in greater detail. 
 
Reallocation Effects 
  A potentially important source of growth comes from the reallocation of resources 
from less productive to more productive activities.  Traditionally, this has been associated 
with a shift of labor from agriculture, where there is initially substantial under-
employment, to industry and then services.  Output per worker in industry and services is 
4 to 5 times that in agriculture.  Thus, employment shifts from agriculture to either of 
these sectors should contribute to substantial gains in productivity and average incomes. 
However, as already discussed, the decline in agriculture as a share of Indian value added 
has been associated with relatively little reallocation of employment.   
  Table 6 provides an estimate of the contribution of factor reallocation to India’s 
growth.  The first column shows growth in total output per worker for various periods.    
The second column shows the combined contribution of growth in each of the three 
sectors, weighted by the sectoral shares.  The data for total and sector growth are taken 
directly from tables 3 and 4.  Thus, the reallocation effect is simply the difference 
between the first and second columns, as shown in column 3.  Post-1980, our calculations 
show that this reallocation contributed roughly one percent per year to output growth.    24





The Role of Capital Accumulation: Additional Perspectives 
 
  In recent years, controversy has surrounded the roles of physical capital and 
education (human capital) in the growth process.   Young (1995) has shown the 
dominance of physical capital accumulation in the growth of the East Asian economies.  
On the other hand, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) argue that physical capital 
accumulation is largely induced by increases in TFP, a phenomenon that leads to an 
overstatement of the contribution of physical capital as an exogenous source of growth.  
Easterly and Levine (2001) argue that only a small percentage of the variation in growth 
across countries could be attributed to capital accumulation.  Baier and others (2006) 
argue the opposite.  Our own reading is that both capital accumulation and gains in TFP 
are important components of the growth process (Bosworth and Collins, 2003), although 
we agree that the precise magnitude of the role varies across countries.  Capital 
accumulation is a necessary part of the process -- regardless of whether it is an exogenous 
or induced factor.  Furthermore, the investment underlying that capital accumulation 
must be financed through national or foreign saving. 
The role of education has been equally controversial.  Many studies, including our 
own, have relied on the strong microeconomic association between education and earning 
to adjust the workforce for improvements in educational attainment.
29  Again, rapid gains 
in educational attainment have been a particular feature of many of the fast-growing East 
Asian economies.  Easterly (2001) and Pritchett (2001) question the relationship between 
education and growth at the aggregate level. 
                                                 
28 See Bosworth (2005) for a similar calculation applied to Thailand. Using a different methodology, 
Wallock (2003) also concludes that much of India’s post 1980s growth is attributable to resource 
movements.   
29 See Bosworth and Collins (2003) for a discussion of the differing perspectives.   25
The growth accounts presented above imply that both human and physical capital 
have made relatively modest contributions to India’s growth performance by international 
standards.  We examine each of these areas in more detail below.  Our examination of 
human capital first reviews the evolution of educational attainment.  Using individual 
level data for selected years from 1983 to 2004, we then present new estimates of the 
extent to which Indian labor markets reward workers for various levels of additional 
schooling.  This issue is of particular relevance, because increases in educational 
attainment have evolved somewhat differently in India than for other rapidly growing 
Asian economies – beginning with the push at tertiary levels, educating large numbers of 
engineers and scientists, and only since 1986 emphasizing primary education more 
broadly.  Finally, the section turns to a discussion of investment and saving in India.  
While India’s national saving rate has been rising and compares favorably to that for low 
income countries, it remains below that for high growth Asian economies.  Is saving 
likely to act as a constraint for India’s growth?  We use the accounting identity linking 
investment to saving to frame our discussion, and explore the evolution over time as well 
as across sectors.  Once again, a variety of issues arise, regarding the data available for 
measurement of both saving and investment.  
 
The Contribution of Education 
India is often cited as having a large cadre of well-educated university graduates.  
However, overall levels of educational attainment are low compared to the East Asian 
countries at similar stages of development.
30  An international comparison suggest that 
India has only now reached  an average  level of schooling comparable to that achieved in 
other Asian countries a quarter century earlier (table 7).  Today, most East Asian 
countries, including China, maintain a substantial lead over India in terms of the average-
years-of-schooling.  Using results from the household surveys, table 8 provides a more 
detailed perspective on the changes in educational attainment of workers since 1960. The 
first row shows that there has been a substantial reduction in the proportion of the 
workforce that is illiterate -- from 72 per cent in the 1961 census.  But illiteracy remains 
                                                 
30 Primary education did not become a national policy priority in India until 1986.  The national Program of 
Universal Elementary Education was launched in 2001.  (For example, see Wu, Kaul and Sankar (2005).   26
high, at about 40 percent currently.  Those who have completed secondary schooling 
account for about 14 percent of workers, while an additional 6 percent have a university 
degree.  Surprisingly, if we limit the analysis to those aged 24-34 in 2004, the proportion 
with a secondary education or better only rises from 20 to 25 percent. 
Education appears to earn a very good return in India, comparable to that of other 




th (1999-00), and the 60
th (2004) rounds of the NSSO employment 
surveys.  These are large surveys that provide estimates of the earnings of workers 
(regular and laborers) as well as their educational attainment -- measured, as in table 8, 
by the highest level completed.  Regression estimates of the relationship between 
schooling and earning in each of the four surveys are shown in table 9.
31 A pattern of 
strongly increasing earnings at each level of education is clearly evident.  Except for 
some evidence of a decline in the return to a secondary education in the 2004 survey, the 
magnitudes of the estimated returns are highly stable across time. 
We also explored an alternative formulation that replaced the categorical variables 
with a single index of years of schooling.
32  (In this formulation, we added two years for 
those with a technical degree or certificate.)  The estimation results imply an average rate 
of return that varies between 9.1 and 9.8 percent per year of schooling. For comparison, 
Psacharapoulus and Patrinos (2004) report an average return to additional schooling of 
about 10 percent both overall and for the sub-group of Asian economies.   However, the 
returns to schooling in India are not quite as uniform as the log-linear formulation would 
imply. Table 10 shows the annual marginal returns for different levels of schooling 
implied by the regression results in table 9.  Interestingly, the incremental returns to 
primary education are significantly lower than the average returns, and there is a large 
jump in the return associated with completing the secondary level of schooling (10 or 12 
years).   The additional return to a university degree was low in the 1980s, but it has been 
rising rapidly in the latest surveys.  This is consistent with the view that India may have 
                                                 
31 Our results for the 1983 and 1993-94 surveys are very similar to those of Duraisamy (2000), who used 
the same two data sets.  Dutta (2004) found somewhat lower returns.  However, her analysis included other 
determinants that are likely to be correlated with educational attainment. 
32Most states have adopted a system of five years for primary, three for middle school, and  two each for 
secondary and higher secondary.  We have treated a university degree a equivalent to three years,and added 
an additional two years of schooling for those with a technical degree.   27
over-invested in higher education in earlier decades for fields such as engineering, 
leading to the large diaspora of Indian engineers abroad.  The rising return in recent years 
is reflective of the changed economic situation, and the potential emergence of a scarcity 
of highly-skilled workers.  
These deviations in the return to schooling from a simple log-linear relationship 
contrast sharply with results for some other countries.
33  Psacharapoulus and Patrinos 
(2004) report a general global pattern in which the returns are highest for elementary 
education and decline slightly for higher levels of educational attainment.  Those findings 
have been used to argue for shifting public resources toward primary education and 
reduction of illiteracy.  However, our results suggest benefits from greater effort to 
ensure that more students complete the secondary education level.  In part, the pattern of 
returns we find can be traced to strong gender effects in the relationship between 
education and earnings.  Women are particularly disadvantaged at low levels of education, 
but do gain correspondingly more from secondary and tertiary education.  In our analysis, 
the jump in incremental returns upon completion of the secondary level is particularly 
pronounced for women.  
The finding of a relatively low return to an elementary education is consistent 
with several recent articles that have been critical of the quality of the primary education 
system.
34  There has also been a large move from public to private schools; but that may 
compound the problems as the poor are increasingly isolated and left behind in the 
process.  Kapur and Mehta (2004) offer an even more critical perspective on the system 
of higher education. They argue that a crisis of governance in the public institutions is 
forcing students into private universities and to enroll abroad.  Such criticisms of India’s 
education system stand in sharp contrast to a generally favorable foreign perspective on 
the Indian education system, perhaps because so many of the highly-educated have 
emigrated.  They also raise challenges for a growth strategy that aims to build on 
economic activities that have a large skill component. 
                                                 
33 The analysis of similar surveys for Thailand found no significant deviation from a log linear return of 10 
percent (Bosworth, 2005).  Also, our own analysis of U.S. data suggests a log-linear relationship is an 
adequate summary of the relationship between earnings and education. 
34 Kochar (2002), and Kremer and others (2005). Psacharapoulus and Patrinos (2004) also report a 
surprisingly low return to primary education  of 3 percent,   28
 
Saving and Investment 
The small contribution of capital per worker to economic growth that is evident in 
the growth accounts highlights important issues about the adequacy of Indian saving and 
capital accumulation for sustaining high growth in the future.  However, several studies 
have pointed to strongly rising rates of saving and investment shown in the national 
accounts to argue that capital accumulation should not be a major constraint on future 
growth.
35   At the same time, the magnitude of recent revisions to the national accounts 
also raises questions about the reliability of the saving and investment data and the extent 
to which they reflect the underlying reality (Shetty, 2006). In this section, we address 
these issues, beginning once again with a discussion of the data available for analysis. 
  In the Indian national accounts, total saving is the sum of three separately-
compiled components: (1) public sector saving, (2) corporate saving and (3) household 
(including non-corporate enterprises) saving.  
 
(7)  h c pub T S S S S + + = . 
 The CSO can construct reasonably good estimates of public sector saving from budget 
records.  Its measure of corporate saving is compiled from a sample of major 
corporations’ income and balance sheets, maintained by the Reserve Bank of India.  
Household saving is further divided into two independently-estimated components: 
physical saving, and net financial saving.  Saving in physical assets is simply set equal to 
investment of the household sector, which is itself a residual estimate, as explained below.  
The estimate of household financial saving is constructed from flow-of-funds measures 
of the net addition to total financial assets less the accumulation of the public and 
corporate sectors. 
The overall national saving rate and its three components are shown as 
percentages of GDP for the period 1970-2004 in figure 2a.  The overall saving rate has 
risen strongly, especially since the mid 1980s.  Further, this increase is dominated by 
major gains in household saving.  Public sector saving actually turned negative in the late 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Mühleisen  (1997) and Rodrik and Subramanian (2004b).   29
1990s, but with some recent improvement.  Corporate saving (retained earnings) grew 
substantially up to 1995, but has since remained in the range of 4-5 percent of GDP.   
Thus, the expansion of saving is concentrated in the household sector.  Total 
household saving has increased from a modest 10 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 
25 percent today.  Furthermore, in the 1970s, over two-thirds of household saving was in 
physical saving, implying that it was dominated by housing and own-account 
construction, much of which never passed through financial institutions.  (An unknown 
portion represents the investment of unincorporated business that are included as part of 
the household sector.)  The most impressive growth has been in the category of financial 
saving, which increased from about 4 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 12 percent in 
recent years and now represents half of household saving.  These funds are available to 
finance investment in other sectors. 
On the investment side, the CSO constructs two direct measures.  The first is an 
estimate of total investment derived using the commodity flow method.  Under that 
method, the total supply of capital goods is estimated from domestic production and 
imports and then apportioned among intermediate inputs and the various components of 
final demand.  Of necessity, many of the demand components and some of the elements 
of domestic production must be estimated using various fixed ratios. Investments of the 
public sector and of private corporations are obtained from the same sources used to 
estimate their saving.  Household investment (physical saving) is derived in turn by 
subtracting public and corporate investment from the total. 
A second direct estimate of capital accumulation is built up from individual 
industries, based largely on the expenditure approach.  Measures of both fixed investment 
and inventory accumulation are constructed from a variety of sources, including surveys, 
public budget documents, and annual reports of public and private enterprises.  Given the 
importance of the unorganized sector, this latter set of estimates is particularly tenuous -- 
but they provide the only information on the distribution of investment at the industry 
level. 
  Finally, by combining the estimate of national saving with the current account 
balance of the balance of payments (CA), the CSO can derive still a third indirect 
measure of total investment:   30
(8)  CA S I T T − = . 
 
 Thus, the CSO actually has three alternative measures of aggregate capital accumulation 
that are largely independent of one another.  Prior to the last revision (1999-00 base), all 
three measures were published with their associated discrepancies.  Since the CSO views 
the valuation from the saving side as the most reliable, this is the one that is emphasized 
in the aggregate table. The various measures of investment and saving are shown for the 
period of 1960 to 2004 in appendix table 2. 
  With the introduction of the 1999-00 base, the CSO made several changes to its 
calculation and presentation of the alternative measures of capital formation.  First, the 
definition of capital accumulation has been changed to include an estimate of net 
purchases of valuables.
36  By 2004-05, these purchases represented 1.4 percent of GNI.  
However, no comparable change was made to include valuables on the saving side.  
Since the saving-side measure of capital accumulation has been the larger in recent years, 
this definitional change had the effect of sharply reducing the magnitude of the reported 
discrepancy between the saving and the commodity-flow measures of capital 
accumulation.  However, we have retained the old treatment and excluded valuables from 
our measure of productive capital. 
Second, the CSO elected to eliminate the second discrepancy between the 
commodity-flow and industry-based estimates by distributing the discrepancy across the 
industry groups in proportion to their estimated levels of investment.  The result was a 
dramatic upward adjustment of the industry-based investment of 30 percent in 1999-00.
37  
A previous pattern of a declining rate of investment – particularly within industry-- was 
converted into a strongly rising trend.  We integrated the new 1999-00 and subsequent 
estimates of both saving and investment into the historical data by phasing the changes in 
between 1993-94 and 1999-00, the same procedure that was used to link in the revisions 
to the other GDP data. 
                                                 
36 The accounts also adopted the suggestion of the 1993 SNA to include purchases of computer software, 
but the accounts do not include the development of own-account software and databases as investment. 
37 The revision to the commodity-flow estimate was a more modest 12 percent.   31
The composition of investment by institutional sector is shown in figure 2b.  It is 
readily evident that the household sector has become an important source of finance for 
both private corporations and the public sector.  The investment of both sectors is much 
larger than their own saving.  The growth of investment, however, is concentrated in 
households and corporations, while public sector investment has been a consistently 
declining share of GDP.  The increase in the household sector is largely due to the 
growing importance of private noncorporate enterprises.  While there was a substantial 
upward revaluation of real estate investment (concentrated in the household sector) in the 
1999-00 revisions, the growth in household investment is substantially larger.
38 
Additional information on the role of the public sector is given in table 11.  First, 
the historically low rate of public saving has primarily been due to the large dissaving in 
the administrative budget.  The shortfall of revenues relative to current outlays first 
emerged in the mid-1980s and then grew steadily over the years.  After peaking in 2001-
02 at 6.6 percent of GNI, the administrative budget deficit has been cut in half in recent 
years.  Saving within public enterprises has increased over the past decade, so that total 
public sector saving turned positive in 2003-04. 
Investment of public enterprises did rise significantly in the 1980s -- a point made 
by those who point to demand stimulus as a cause of the acceleration of growth in the 
1980s.
39  However, enterprise investment was steadily cut back after the surge of the 
1980s.  Investment in the administrative budget has remained very low in recent years -- 
between one and two percent of GNI.  The low investment within the administrative 
budget reflects a longstanding lack of attention to infrastructure needs, particularly road 
building.  Some other types of infrastructure investment are captured in the industry data 
for public utilities, transportation and communications, shown as an addendum to table 
11.  Again, this type of investment has also remained low as a share of GNI. 
Some of the increase in the rate of gross investment that has taken place over the 
last quarter century has been offset by a rise in capital consumption allowances as a share 
of GDP.  During the latest 5-year period (2000-04), net investment has averaged 17 
                                                 
38 As discussed in the section on growth accounts, the national accounts do not currently separate 
investment of the business services industry from that of real estate investment.  That is unfortunate given 
the interest in the rapidly expanding business services industry. 
39 See Srinivasan (2003b) and Buiter and Patel (1992).   32
percent of GDP (appendix table 2).  The aggregate capital-output ratio has also been a 
stable 2.5 times GDP.  These figures suggest that the current rate of capital formation is 
sufficient to support a growth rate of about 7 percent per annum.   
Is saving constraining India’s growth?  To the contrary, we think the evidence 
suggests a higher potential growth rate should be quite feasible.  First, the private saving 
rate appears to be rising over time.
40  Second, India should be able to support a 
significantly higher rate of foreign saving (current account deficit), particularly if this 
were financed by higher rates of FDI.  Third, there continues to be substantial room for 
improving the saving performance of the public sector.   
As an additional reason for believing that current rates of saving are adequate to 
support future growth, we note that we can find little evidence of heightened competition 
for domestic capital.  We constructed a lending rate by averaging the rates of four major 
lending institutions, as reported by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).  A real interest rate 
was computed on an annual basis using the ex-post realized rate of increase in the 
Wholesale Price Index.  These data are summarized in table 12.  While the real rate 
shows considerable fluctuation, there is little evidence of a secular increase.  Although 
the rate rose in the late 1990s, this appears to have been a transitory response to a sharp 
decline in the inflation rate.   Furthermore, a real interest rate in the range of 5-7 percent 
is not particularly high for a developing country.   
Overall, this evidence suggests to us that the low contribution of capital 
accumulation to growth has largely been a product of the incentives to undertake 
investment, rather than a saving constraint.   Hallward-Dreimeir (2005) provides a recent 
overview of the literature on business climate and its implications for investment and 
private sector activity.  Referring to the World Bank’s survey based indicators – “Doing 
Business” – she finds that India ranks in the bottom 25 percent of countries.  The survey 
highlights firms’ concerns, including poor access to electricity, and stringent labor 
regulations.  The public sector, in particular, has not responded to obvious signs of 
insufficient infrastructure capital. 
                                                 
40 Several international studies of saving in developing countries conclude that there is a strong positive 
association with the level of income.  For a discussion see Mühleisen (1997), and Loayza and others (2000).  
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Implications for the Future 
 
  India is still a very poor economy, and increasing overall living standards is 
clearly the major priority.  To achieve this, it is necessary both to raise labor productivity, 
and to speed up the pace of job creation for those currently underemployed in rural 
agriculture. Our analysis in prior sections points to three implications for achieving this 
critical objective.   
First is a need to broaden the base of the economic expansion beyond the modern 
service sector, which, by itself, can not provide the requisite number of job opportunities.  
This implies a much more rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector, which will 
require strengthening India’s infrastructure, raising private sector investment and 
adopting a more aggressive approach to expanding India’s export markets.  A second 
implication of our work is good news -- India has strong prospects for increasing the 
saving necessary to finance the additional capital accumulation.  The third focuses on 
accelerating the pace of improvements in the educational attainment of the population: 
This requires a greater emphasis on increasing primary and secondary schooling, as well 
as expanding its already substantial pool of highly educated labor.   Finally, the lack of 
reliable annual statistics on employment is a major limitation on efforts to evaluate 
current economic performance.  Thus, we believe that India would benefit greatly from  
undertaking an ongoing household survey that would provide annual time-consistent 
measures of labor-market performance.  While we are certainly not the first to advocate 
these actions, we believe our analysis sheds additional light on the reasons for their 
importance. 
  Over the past decade, India’s economic growth has been concentrated in the 
service sector.  On the one hand, there are many positive dimensions of this development.  
India’s rapid in-roads into global markets for products such as business services have 
increased domestic exposure to the world marketplace in areas with considerable room 
for expansion.  As we have seen, the services growth is not limited to a few selected IT 
related activities, but appears to be considerably broader than often recognized.  And   34
recent studies have found that growth in services has generated increased demand for 
industrial products as well.
41   
  While India’s very rapid recent growth in services is well known, some other 
unusual dimensions of its growth pattern have received less attention.  Kochhar and 
others (2006) compares India’s development pattern to that for a large cross section of 
economies, controlling for both per capita income levels and country size. They find that, 
in 1981, India was an outlier in terms of the relatively low share of services in both GDP 
and employment.  While the share devoted to manufacturing did not stand out at that time, 
they find that Indian production was concentrated in relatively skill-intensive industries.  
Between the early 1980s and 2002, the share of agriculture in India’s GDP declined, 
while the share of services increased.  Currently, the Indian economy does stand out for 
its relatively low manufactures share of GDP, and the high proportion of employment 
remaining in agriculture.  The paper also notes that both manufactures and services are 
relatively concentrated in skill-intensive output.  Virmani (2005) points out that the 
manufactures share of GDP was just 15.8 percent in 2003, well below comparator 
countries in East Asia.  For instance, manufactures shares ranged from 21 percent in 
Vietnam to 39 percent in China.
42   
This development pattern is not one that offers expanding job opportunities for a 
labor force that is dominated by relatively low-skilled workers.  Only a rapidly-
expanding manufacturing sector, producing labor-intensive products for both global 
markets and the domestic economy, offers the prospect of creating a large number jobs 
aligned with the skills of the majority of the Indian workforce. 
How could India encourage the development of a private manufacturing sector, as 
a companion to the vibrant services industries?  In recent years, considerable research has 
sought to identify the determinants of private sector growth, with much of the analysis 
emphasizing the importance of the investment climate faced by entrepreneurs.  An 
attractive environment for doing business is now typically seen as having a variety of 
dimensions, ranging from access to infrastructure and financial services, to factors such 
as the security of property rights and a simple and transparent regulatory system.    The 
                                                 
41 See Banga and Goldar (2004)  
42  Kochhar and others (2006) also examine the patters of development across India states.   35
World Bank’s Investment Climate and Doing Business Surveys are intended to strengthen 
available measures of these and other aspects of the investment climate by including a 
number of objective questions as well as some more subjective ones.   Both cover a large 
number of countries, including India.   Many of these indicators have been shown to have 
a strong correlation with growth in cross-country studies, and with labor productivity in 
micro-economic studies of firm behavior.
43   
How does India fare in this evaluation of its business climate?  There is both good 
news and areas for concern.  The Business Competitiveness Index for 2004 ranks India 
37
th out of 101 countries.  This relatively favorable assessment largely reflects the pool of 
highly skilled scientists, engineers and strong management programs.  The main concerns 
include regulatory issues and inadequate infrastructure.
44  Thus, India ranks a poor 116
th 
out of 155 countries in the 2005 Doing Business indicators, which focus only on 10 
regulatory areas.  It does particularly poorly in terms of enforcing contracts (138
th), 
trading across boarders (130
th) dealing with licenses (124
th) and employing workers 
(116
th).  However, India ranks 84
th in terms of getting credit and a strong 29
th for 
protecting investors.
45   
Results from India’s Investment Survey highlight concerns about infrastructure – 
especially electricity.
46  Respondents noted very high delays in obtaining electrical 
connections and large value lost to electric outages.  The World Bank report concludes 
that India’s power supply difficulties arise largely from problems with transmission and 
distribution (T&D).  In 2003, the average Indian firm experienced power outages nearly 
every other day – more that three times the frequency endured by businesses in Brazil, 
and more than seven times that endured in China.  The study also reports that output 
losses due to outages in India were more than four times those in either China or Brazil.  
                                                 
43  For example, see Hallward-Driemeier (2006).  Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002) find that differences 
in investment climate across Indian states explain a substantial share of the differences in labor-
productivity, using a sample of 1000 manufacturing firms. 
44  See Hallward-Driemeier (2006).   
45 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
46 Summary information for India’s results in the Investment Climate Survey are available at:  
http://rru.worldbank.org/EnterpriseSurveys/ExploreEconomies/Default.aspx?economyid=89   36
Furthermore, average power tariffs for industrial use in India are relatively high – around 
$0.08 per kwh compared with $0.05 elsewhere in Southesast Asia.
47  
 Virmani (2005) notes that there are two fundamental problems that must be 
addressed.  First, policy and regulatory risks are still too high, despite the passage of the 
Electricity Act of 2003, discouraging the entry of private producers.  Second, the issue of 
T&D losses (in reality, utter theft) has not been seriously addressed. Officially reported 
T&D losses at the all-India level were 32.5 percent of total availability in 2003-4. Others 
have suggested that independent audits would place these losses closer to 50 percent of 
available capacity.  Private entry into distribution cannot be sustained unless organized 
theft is eliminated and T&D losses brought down to levels considered normal across the 
World (i.e. around 8%).   
Major concerns have also been raised about logistical difficulties in India.  In 
particular, road networks are relatively poor, limiting internal transport, especially in 
some poorer regions.  Detailing both infrastructure problems and operational weaknesses, 
a 2002 World Bank study concluded that “poor transport has become a major drag on 
economic growth.”
48  The study notes that China had roughly five times the kilometers of 
four to six-lane expressways.  Most Indian national highways are only one or two lanes, 
and heavy congestion on both national and state roads implies that trucks and buses can 
travel at, on average, just half the expected speed.  The 2004 report notes that India’s 
major economic areas are not linked by an inter-state highway system.  In contrast, China 
is enjoying the benefits of having undertaken an extensive investment in its highway 
system over the past decade.
49  We also note the dramatic effect that building a system of 
interstate highways had for the United States, as suggestive of the benefits of such a 
program for India.   Although the government has announced a major program to upgrade 
and extend the highway system, implementation has been constrained by a lack of 
funding. 
On the more positive front, over 70 percent of respondents in the Investment 
Survey expressed confidence in India’s judiciary system, compared with less than 60 
                                                 
47 World Bank (2004).  See esp. pp. 35-36. 
48 World Bank (2002) p. 7. 
49 World Bank (2004), p. 36.   37
percent overall and just 48 percent in South Asia.  Furthermore, India has achieved major 
gains expanding access to high quality communications services, primarily by relying on 
a rapid expansion of the private wireless component. 
The discussion above stresses areas in which additional investment is needed to 
make India an attractive business location. Our analysis suggests that the saving, required 
to finance the investment, does not appear to pose an additional constraint.  In this 
dimension, we believe that India’s prospects are quite favorable.   It is true that the 
overall saving rate has not been as impressive as that of the high-growth East Asian 
economics.  However, India’s private saving rate was comparable to the developing 
country average in the mid-1960s, and has grown more rapidly.
50   As incomes increase, 
experiences elsewhere suggest that India’s private saving would be expected to increase 
somewhat further. 
Equally important, India has considerable scope for raising foreign saving through 
increased FDI. A number of studies have documented that there are strong positive 
effects of increased FDI flows for domestic investment.   However, to date India has 
received little of the very substantial global FDI flows to developing countries. Virmani 
(2005) notes that during 1980-2003 FDI flows averaged only 0.3% of India’s GDP, 
putting India in the 7
th percentile of his sample of 82 medium large countries.  Despite 
some recent liberalization, India’s ranking remains near the bottom of such indicators.  
Estimates of the stock of FDI assets by country constructed by Philip Lane and Gian 
Maria Milesi-Ferretti show that as a share of GD India’s FDI stock is less than one fifth 
that for China..
51  
Concerns about the adequacy of national saving are centered on the behavior of 
the public sector.  As discussed in a prior section, the public saving rate has fallen 
dramatically over the past twenty years. In part, this reflects a deteriorating situation 
within the public enterprises, requiring substantial subsidies and other transfers from the 
central administrative budget.  In addition, central administrative budget deficits have 
become endemic. 
                                                 
50 For example, see Loayza and Shankar (2000). 
51 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  Their data are available at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~cengel/CAConference/WP_External%20Wealth_final.pdf   38
Finally, the assessment of India’s economic performance is made difficult by the 
lack of statistical coverage of large portions of the economy.  In particular, there is no 
consistent information on employment between the quinquennial surveys.  At a minimum 
India need an annual survey for the intervening years.  The quality of the quinquennial 
surveys appears to be high, but the development of the sample frame for each survey is a 
major undertaking.  In addition, by constructing a large portion of the sample frame as a 
new undertaking for each survey, the results have suffered from a lack of consistency 
over time. We believe that the maintenance and continue use of the sample frame from 
the quinquennial survey over the following five years would provide a relatively low cost 





  In this paper, we have revisited some of the key issues regarding India’s economic 
growth performance and prospects.  Our work updates previous studies, and presents 
results based on analysis of new data.  Our analysis focuses on the periods de-lineated by 
the survey benchmark years: 1960, 1973, 1983, 1993, 1999 and 2004 due to concerns 
about India’s annual output data. We have argued that researchers should have a 
reasonable degree of confidence in the GDP estimates for benchmark years.  However, 
for non-benchmark years, annual output data are based on interpolation and extrapolation 
of the labor input data required to construct output measures for India’s large 
unorganized sector.   These estimates have been subject to substantial revisions.  We 
conclude that the lack of reliable annual series make it impossible to pin down the precise 
timing of India’s growth acceleration.  Although it does seem clear that growth 
accelerated after 1983, the precise triggering events and the sustainability of this growth 
remain topics of on-going debate.    
  India’s output growth has doubled from just 3.3 percent per year during our initial 
period of 1960-73, to over 6 percent per year during the past decade.  In the initial period, 
we find that growth can be fully attributed to increases in factor inputs – with nearly two-
thirds accounted for by increased employment, and a third by increases in capital per   39
worker.   Growth accelerated to 4.2 percent per year during the second sub-period, 1973-
83.  Just over half of the gains are associated with TFP, and the remainder with 
employment.  The acceleration appears related to the green revolution, with gains 
accruing to both increases in agricultural TFP and sectoral reallocation.  Labor 
productivity declined in both services and industry.  There was a further, modest, 
acceleration of output growth, to 5 percent per year during 1983-93.  This increase can all 
be attributed to increased TFP, concentrated in services and industry (especially 
manufacturing).   However, analysts remain divided on the reasons for the rise in growth 
during this period, with the many possible explanations including (unsustainable) fiscal 
expansion and response to initial policy reforms.   
Output growth surged to 7 per cent per year during 1993-99.  Given the somewhat 
puzzling decline in employment, there is a particularly large jump in labor productivity – 
concentrated in services but evident in all sectors. It is associated with rises in both TFP 
and capital deepening.  Output moderated somewhat during the most recent period (1999-
2004) with growth slowing in all sectors, in part due to the severe drought.  Contributions 
from TFP and capital deepening slowed in both services and industry.  Notably, 
investment failed to keep up with the more rapid employment growth.  However, we note 
that the two latter periods are quite short. Growth accounting is most appropriate for 
relatively long time periods of a decade or more, in which output performance is not 
dominated by cyclical shocks. 
  Considerable attention has been focused on the role of services – especially high-
tech services – as the source of India’s growth.  Our growth accounts attribute 1.4 
percentage points of the 3.8 percent per annum GDP growth during 1980-2004 to growth 
in total services output (versus 0.7 percentage points each to agriculture and industry and 
1 percent to reallocation, respectively).  However, the very strong gains in service sector 
TFP are quite puzzling.  One might expect such rapid productivity growth in sub-sectors 
such as finance and business services, but these sectors remain small – just 17 percent of 
total services output in 2004.  In fact, the output growth is quite widely dispersed across 
service sub-sectors.  But rapid productivity growth seems unlikely in the biggest, which 
are trade, transportation and community services.  Though difficult to verify, we 
hypothesize that output growth in services has been overstated due to an underestimate of   40
services price inflation, particularly in the more traditional sectors.  We have more 
confidence in the estimates of the growth in employment. 
The accounting decomposition finds that the growth contribution from increases 
in education has been quite modest.  While India can boast a relatively large share of 
highly educated workers for its income level, average years of schooling and literacy 
rates among its population remain low, and the effort to achieve universal primary 
education is quite recent.  Not only does India have a long way to go to catch up with 
competitors such as China, the rapid increase in school enrollments appears to have 
exacerbated concerns about educational quality –particularly in poorer regions.  We do 
find strongly increasing returns to schooling that have remained quite stable over time.  
However, we confirm the finding of low returns to primary education – perhaps 
associated with quality concerns.  Further, the substantial additional gains from 
completing secondary school are particularly strong for women. 
Overall, the growth accounts show that capital deepening has also made small 
made contributions to growth – despite the recent data revisions that substantially 
increased in measured investment since 1993.  Does the revised data put to rest earlier 
concerns that investment may be too low, and constraining growth?  The data do now 
show a strongly rising trend for gross investment.  However, net investment averaged 
about 17 percent of GDP during 1999-2004, which we estimate can support an annual 
growth rate of roughly 7 percent.  More rapid growth over the longer term would require 
an increased investment rate.  Notably, the investment increases have been concentrated 
in the private sector, while public sector investment has fallen steadily as a share of GDP.  
As discussed below, this is particularly problematic, given concerns about India’s weak 
and deteriorating infrastructure. 
We also examine the evolution of India’s saving behavior, to explore whether 
saving is likely to constrain India’s investment.  We argue that private saving in India has 
performed remarkably well.  The rise is concentrated among households, who now save 
fully 25 percent of GDP.  Further, nearly half household saving is in the form of financial 
saving, available to fund corporate or public investment.  Corporate saving has also risen 
somewhat over the period.  However, public sector saving has been very low historically,   41
turning negative during the late 1990s, before recovering somewhat more recently.  
While not a major focus of this paper, the administrative budget deficit remains a major 
policy concern.  We conclude that saving is not constraining India’s growth.  There is 
room for increased public saving, as well as a rise in foreign saving, particularly if 
financed through FDI which remains quite low in India. 
Pulling together the findings of our analysis we draw a number of implications for 
India’s growth in the coming decade.  Our starting point is that increasing living 
standards in India will require a combination of increasing employment and raising labor 
productivity.  To date, the rise in India’s output growth has been associated with little or 
no rise in overall rates of job creation.  And while agricultural output has fallen as a share 
of GDP, agriculture’s share of total employment remains surprisingly high.  We find that 
labor productivity in agriculture is just one-fifth that in either industry or services, 
implying significant productivity gains from further sectoral reallocation of labor. 
Thus, India needs to broaden the base of its economic growth through greater 
efforts to promote the expansion of the industrial sector – especially manufacturing – and 
to emphasize the creation of jobs as well as gains in TFP.  In this context, China provides 
a useful model, in its use of exports manufactured under foreign contract as a primary 
driver for growth.  One key attraction to this strategy is that it provided rapidly expanding 
employment opportunities for relatively young, and low-skilled, workers.  A second is 
that it generated large feedback effects for the domestic economy – both in promoting 
linkages to the supplying industries (including services) and in developing local expertise 
for doing business in a global market. 
To follow this strategy, India needs to create a more attractive economic 
environment for doing business – a location able to compete effectively with China.  This 
will require strengthening its infrastructure – including a weak and unreliable power 
system, and poor land transportation in many states.  However, compared with China, 
India already enjoys relative good institutions and is strong in the areas of finance and 
business services. 
  Finally, we stress that successful implementation of this growth strategy should 
not be expected to generate rapid TFP growth within the growing sectors.  Expansion of   42
both industry and services will draw workers out of agriculture.  This will generate gains 
in aggregate TFP from the reallocation of labor to more productivity activities and from 
reduced labor redundancy in agriculture.  Thus, reforms should be directed towards 
making it easier to expand domestic production, and a creating a more attractive location 
for foreign producers.  We see the prospects for sustaining this broad-based type of high 
growth in India as strong.   43
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 Table 1.  Measures of the Organized and Unorganized Sectors by Industry. 1999-2000
percent
Industry Distribution of
GDP by sector Organized Unorganized Unorganized
Agriculture, forestry and fishering 25.3 3.1 -- 99.1
Agriculture 23.2 3.2 -- 99.2
Forestry and logging 1.1 5.6 -- 98.3
Fishing 1.1 0.1 -- 98.5
Industry 25.4 62.5 37.5 ..
Mining and Quarrying 2.3 91.6 8.4 90.7
Manufacturing 14.7 60.8 39.2 97.9
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.5 93.8 6.2 90.1
Construction
1
5.9 41.8 58.2 85.8
Services 49.2 51.3 48.7 ..
Trade 12.9 18.1 81.9 84.7
Hotel and restaurants 1.2 41.2 58.8 90.7
Transport and storage 5.8 35.2 64.8 79.3
Communication  1.6 91.4 8.6 92.8
Banking and insurance  5.9 90.5 9.5 88.7
Real estate, ownership of 
dwellings and business services  7.1 18.6 81.4 89.9
Public admininistration and defence 6.7 100.0 0.0 0.4
Other services 8.1 69.5 30.5 87.4
Non-agricultural sector 74.7 56.0 44.0 88.3
Total
2
100.0 42.0 32.4 95.6
Source: Saha, Kar and Baskaran (2004) and Government of India, Central Statistical Office (2006,February)
1. norganized employment in construction includes casual laborers in the organized sector. 
Percent of sector GDP Percent of sector employmentTable 2. National Accounts Revisions, Benchmark Years 1993-94 and 1999-00
Millions of rupees
Sector Share  1980-81    1993-94  Percent Share  1993-94  1999-00 Percent
  of Total  series    series   Change of Total  series    series   Change
 (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing   30.3 2,237 2,424 8.4 25.3 4,620 4,541 -1.7
Agriculture   27.9 2,063 2,231 8.2 23.2 4,224 4,153 -1.7
Forestry and logging   1.3 98 102 3.9 1.1 196 195 -0.4
Fishing   1.1 75 91 20.2 1.1 200 192 -3.9
Industry 25.8 2,040 2,058 0.9 25.4 4,556 4,556 0.0
Mining and quarrying   2.5 168 197 17.1 2.3 413 416 0.7
Manufacturing   15.9 1,276 1,267 -0.7 14.7 2,667 2,641 -1.0
Rregistered   10.4 812 831 2.3 9.7 1,708 1,730 1.3
Unregistered   5.5 464 436 -6.0 5.1 959 911 -5.0
Electricity, gas and water supply   2.4 189 190 0.5 2.5 423 447 5.8
Construction   5.1 407 404 -0.7 5.9 1,053 1,051 -0.1
Services 43.9 3,051 3,508 15.0 49.2 8,443 8,826 4.5
Trade, hotels and restaurants   13.9 980 1,110 13.2 14.2 2,460 2,541 3.3
Trade   13.2 922 1,056 14.6 12.9 2,290 2,319 1.3
Hotel and restaurants   0.7 59 54 -7.5 1.2 170 223 30.7
Transport, storage and communication   7.3 561 580 3.4 7.4 1,243 1,318 6.0
Railways   1.2 96 96 0.0 1.1 156 195 24.8
Transport by other means   4.8 371 383 3.4 4.6 819 824 0.6
Storage   0.1 6 6 6.9 0.1 13 14 13.1
Communication   1.2 88 94 6.9 1.6 256 284 11.3
Finance, insurance, real estate and business 
services  11.2 671 896 33.4 13.0 2,206 2,328 5.5
Banking and insurance   5.2 436 417 -4.4 5.9 1,191 1,057 -11.3
Real estate and business services  6.0 236 479 103.3 7.1 1,015 1,271 25.2
Community, social and personal services   11.5 839 923 10.0 14.7 2,534 2,640 4.2
Public administration and defence   5.4 400 431 7.9 6.7 1,167 1,197 2.6
Other services   6.2 439 492 12.0 8.1 1,367 1,443 5.6
Total GDP at factor cost   100.0 7,329 7,991 9.0 100.0 17,618 17,923 1.7
1993-94 GDP by Sector 1999-00 GDP by Sector
Source: Central Statistical Organisation (2004, p.8), Central Statistical Organisation (2006, February, p.11), and authors' estimates.Table 3. Sources of Economic Growth, Total  Economy, 1960-2005
Annual percentage rate of change
Output Employment Output  per Physical Factor
Period Worker Capital Land Education Productivity
Total Economy
1960-04 4.7 2.0 2.6 1.2 -0.1 0.3 1.2
1960-80 3.4 2.2 1.3 1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.2
1980-04 5.8 1.9 3.8 1.4 0.0 0.4 2.0
1960-73 3.3 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2
1973-83 4.2 2.4 1.8 0.9 -0.2 0.3 0.6
1983-93 5.0 2.1 2.9 0.9 -0.1 0.3 1.7
1993-99 7.0 1.2 5.8 2.4 -0.1 0.4 2.8
1999-04 6.0 2.4 3.6 1.2 0.1 0.4 2.0
Source: Authors' calculations as explained in text.
Contribution of:Table 4. Sources of Economic Growth,  Major Sectors, 1960-2005
Annual percentage rate of change
Output Employment Output  per Physical Factor
Period Worker Capital Land Education Productivity
Agriculture
1960-04 2.4 1.4 1.0 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.6
1960-80 1.9 1.8 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.1
1980-04 2.8 1.0 1.8 0.5 -0.1 0.3 1.1
1960-73 1.8 1.9 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2
1973-83 2.9 1.7 1.2 0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.9
1983-93 2.9 1.4 1.5 0.2 -0.1 0.2 1.2
1993-99 2.6 0.2 2.4 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.3
1999-04 1.8 1.0 0.8 0.9 -0.2 0.4 -0.1
Industry (Inclusive of Manufacturing)
1960-04 5.6 3.3 2.3 1.6 0.3 0.3
1960-80 4.7 3.1 1.6 1.8 0.3 -0.4
1980-04 6.4 3.5 2.9 1.6 0.3 1.0
1960-73 4.7 2.3 2.4 2.3 0.2 -0.1
1973-83 5.2 4.5 0.7 1.1 0.3 -0.8
1983-93 6.0 2.9 3.1 1.3 0.3 1.4
1993-99 6.9 2.4 4.5 3.0 0.5 1.0
1999-04 6.4 5.5 0.9 -0.1 0.2 0.9
Manufacturing
1960-04 5.7 2.6 3.1 1.8 0.3 0.9
1960-80 4.6 2.7 2.0 1.5 0.3 0.2
1980-04 6.6 2.6 4.0 2.1 0.4 1.5
1960-73 4.9 1.5 3.4 2.1 0.2 1.1
1973-83 5.3 4.3 1.0 1.0 0.4 -0.3
1983-93 6.0 2.1 3.9 1.3 0.4 2.1
1993-99 7.2 1.7 5.5 4.6 0.6 0.3
1999-04 6.4 4.4 2.0 0.4 0.3 1.4
Services
1960-04 6.3 3.2 3.1 0.9 0.4 1.7
1960-80 4.9 2.8 2.0 1.1 0.5 0.4
1980-04 7.6 3.6 4.0 0.7 0.4 2.9
1960-73 4.7 1.9 2.8 1.8 0.4 0.5
1973-83 5.3 4.2 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
1983-93 6.5 3.8 2.7 0.3 0.4 2.0
1993-99 10.2 3.1 7.0 1.5 0.5 4.9
1999-04 7.8 3.5 4.4 0.9 0.4 3.1
Source: Authors' estimates as described in text.
Contribution of:Figure 1.  Growth in TFP by Major Sector, 1960-2004
Index, 1960 = 1.0













































1960-61 19 2 6 1 10 81 40 14 27 100
1980-81 22 3 7 1 11 78 37 16 24 100
1993-94 31 3 14 2 12 69 34 14 21 100
1999-00 35 6 14 4 12 65 33 12 19 100
2004-05 40 11 12 5 11 60 33 11 16 100
1960-80 5.7 6.9 5.9 3.4 5.5 4.6 4.5 5.6 4.3 4.9
1980-93 9.0 7.1 12.3 9.8 6.6 5.4 5.6 5.4 4.9 6.3
1993-99 12.6 20.3 9.3 28.0 10.6 8.9 9.8 7.5 8.6 10.1
1999-04 10.5 23.8 5.7 11.4 7.1 6.5 7.9 5.7 4.3 8.0
1960-80 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.5 3.8 1.8 0.8 1.2 4.9
1980-93 2.0 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 4.2 2.1 0.9 1.2 6.3
1993-99 3.9 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.2 6.2 3.3 1.1 1.8 10.1
1999-04 3.7 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.8 4.2 2.6 0.7 0.8 8.0
source: authors' calculations from CSO (2006) and prior years.
Percentage Contribution to Total Services Growth
Modern Services Traditonal Services
Share of Total Output in Services




Period (1) (2) (1)-(2)
1960-80 1.3 0.9 0.4
1980-04 3.8 2.8 1.0
1960-73 1.3 1.1 0.2
1973-83 1.8 1.0 0.8
1983-93 2.9 2.3 0.6
1993-99 5.8 4.8 1.0
1999-04 3.6 2.4 1.2
Authors' estimates as described in the text.
              Sectoral Growth vs. Reallocation Effects
Table 6. Growth in Output per Worker, 1960-2005Percent
Average
No Below Post Years
Schooling Middle Middle Secondary Secondary of
Country Year School
India 1960 72.2 16.2 11.1 0.4 0.00 1.7
1980 55.0 10.0 23.9 8.6 2.61 2.9
2000 40.7 9.9 27.1 16.8 5.60 4.5
China 1960
1980 34.0 19.5 35.6 10.2 0.60 4.8
2000 18.0 21.1 43.3 15.5 2.10 6.4
Thailand 1960 36.9 12.7 47.6 2.3 0.40 4.3
1980 14.4 66.1 12.1 6.4 0.90 4.4
2000 12.6 34.5 37.9 8.1 7.00 6.5
Malaysia 1960 49.7 25.0 20.5 3.6 1.10 2.9
1980 26.8 22.2 41.0 8.8 1.10 5.1
2000 16.2 16.4 48.7 15.8 2.90 6.8
Indonesia 1960 68.0 16.8 14.5 0.8 0.00 1.6
1980 31.9 33.0 29.3 5.7 0.10 3.7
2000 32.1 18.2 36.7 12.4 0.50 5.0
Source: Barro and Lee (2000), NSSO various years, and authors' calculations.
Table 7. Educational Attainment of the Total Population Aged 15 and Over, Selected 
Countries and Years.
Highest Level Attained
Note: Data for India in 1980 and 2000 come from the surveys conducted in 1983-84 and 
1999-2000, respectively.Table 8. Educational Attainment of Workers Aged 15-64
percent
Schooling Level 1960 1983-84 1993-94 1999-00 2004
Illiterate 72.2 56.6 48.5 43.5 39.4
Below Primary 11.1 12.0 11.0 9.1
Primary 12.8 11.9 11.7 14.5
Middle 11.1 9.6 11.8 14.1 17.1
Secondary 7.5 9.3 8.9
Higher Secondary 3.7 4.5 5.1
Graduate 0.0 2.7 4.5 5.9 6.0
Source: NSSO (various years), and authors' calculations.
Note: Data for 1960 reflect educational attainment of all persons 15+.
16.2
0.4 7.2Table 9. Regressions of Wages on Educational Attainment, 1983-2004
#38 #50 #55 #60
Coefficient (1983) (1993-94) (1999-2000) (2004)
Below Primary 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.24
Primary 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.34
Middle 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.54
Secondary 0.91 0.92 0.78
Higher Secondary 1.07 1.14 1.01
Diploma Certificate 1.32
Graduate 1.39 1.37 1.52 1.47
Tech Degree 0.51 0.51
Tech Certificate 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.25
Female -0.53 -0.44 -0.44 -0.46
Rural -0.44 -0.33 -0.41 -0.45
Constant 8.44 9.27 5.38 5.52
adj_R
2 0.50 0.40 0.54 0.50
RMSE 0.70 0.86 0.69 0.72
Sample size 87,769 81,038 88,430 42,501
Table 10. Implied Incremental Rates of Return by Schooling Level
percent
#38 #50 #55 #60
Schooling Level (1983) (1993-94) (1999-2000) (2004)
Below Primary 6.3 7.3 7.6 8.0
Primary 4.3 3.9 4.0 3.4
Middle 5.4 4.2 3.8 4.5
Secondary 14.9 15.4 9.2
Higher Secondary 4.0 5.5 6.3
Graduate 4.3 4.7 5.6 7.1
Survey Round
10.5
Computed from the coefficients in table 9: the proportionate change in the 
coefficient of progressively higher levels of education expressed as an 
annual rate.
Note: Sample includes all persons aged 15 to 64 who reported positive 
wages during the reference week. The dependent variable is the log of the 
weekly wage.  Regressions also included categorical variables for sub-round 
and ten-year age brackets (not shown).  The excluded education category is 
illiterates.  All coefficients shown are significant  at the .0001 probability level 
or higher.
1.02
Source: Government of India, National Sample Survey Organization, various 
years and authors' calculations.
Survey RoundFigure 2a. Gross National Saving by Sector, 1970-2004
Figure 2b. Capital Formation by Sector, 1970 -2004























































HouseholdTable 11. Saving and Investment of the Public Sector, 1970-2004
percent of GNI
1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Public sector saving 3.7 3.7 2.4 1.4 0.6 -0.3
Administration 2.0 1.4 -1.2 -2.0 -3.3 -5.1
Other public 1.7 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.9 4.8
Public sector investment 8.2 9.9 10.2 8.9 7.7 7.4
Administration 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0
Other public 6.8 8.3 8.6 7.5 6.2 5.5
Puiblic sector net lending -4.5 -6.2 -7.8 -7.5 -7.1 -7.7
Administration 0.6 -0.2 -2.8 -3.3 -4.5 -7.0
Other public -5.1 -6.0 -5.0 -4.2 -2.3 -0.6
Addenda:
Infrastructure investment 4.2 4.8 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.7
Source: appendix table 1.
Table 12. Nominal and Real Lending Rates, 1970-2004
Year 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
Nominal lending rate 9.0 10.4 13.3 13.9 16.7 15.2 11.4
Inflation rate 15.3 4.7 9.3 6.7 11.0 5.3 5.2
Real interest rate -4.9 5.9 3.9 6.8 5.2 9.4 5.9
Source: Reserve Bank of India(2006), tables 70 and 169.
note: Infrastucture investment includes investment of public utilities and the transportation and 
communication industries.
The nominal lending rate is an average of the rates for four major lending institutions.  The inflation rate is 
measured by the annual rate of change in the wholesale price index for all commodities.Appendix 1. Data Used to Compute Workforce, 1973-04
 round   date
   ps    all   ps  all  
27 1-Apr-73 545 318
32 1-Jan-78 537 552 248 331
38 1-Jul-83 528 547 248 340
43 1-Jan-88 517 539 245 323
50 1-Jan-94 538 553 234 328
55 1-Jan-00 522 531 231 299
60 1-Mar-04 527 542 228 315
27 1-Apr-73 501 134
32 1-Jan-78 497 508 123 156
38 1-Jul-83 500 512 120 151
43 1-Jan-88 496 506 118 152
50 1-Jan-94 513 521 121 155
55 1-Jan-00 513 518 117 139
60 1-Mar-04 531 518 121 150
male female male female
27 1-Apr-73 233.6 221.7 63.3 54.6
32 1-Jan-78 254.4 241.7 75.6 65.9
38 1-Jul-83 280.6 266.0 91.1 80.4
43 1-Jan-88 305.5 287.9 104.4 92.8
50 1-Jan-94 339.4 319.4 124.0 111.1
55 1-Jan-00 374.4 353.8 145.9 131.2
60 1-Mar-04 396.8 375.2 161.6 145.5
mid round male female male female
27 1-Apr-73 127.3 70.5 31.7 7.3
32 1-Jan-78 140.4 80.0 38.4 10.3
38 1-Jul-83 153.5 90.5 46.6 12.1
43 1-Jan-88 164.7 93.0 52.8 14.1
50 1-Jan-94 187.7 104.8 64.6 17.2
55 1-Jan-00 198.8 105.8 75.6 18.2
60 1-Mar-04 215.0 118.2 83.7 21.8
 usually employed  
 male    female  
urban rural
rural





Sources: Worker participation rates, NSSO (2001) table 6.1, p. 76; and 
NSSO (2005) p. 21; Population, 1973-88 data from Visaria (202), p13; 
later years from Sundaram and Tedulkar (2005a) table 1, 2004 from 
census projections. Workforce, computed by authors.Appendix 2. Components of Saving and Invesment Balance, 1960-2004
percent of GNI
Year 1960-79 1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
Gross domestic saving 15.1 17.6 18.5 20.5 23.3 25.3 28.9 26.0 25.9 29.0 31.6 32.1
Household Sector 10.4 12.3 13.2 16.2 18.7 19.9 24.6 23.4 24.2 25.3 25.7 24.3
Financial savings 3.7 4.6 6.4 7.3 10.2 10.5 11.7 11.3 11.9 11.3 12.5 11.4
Physical savings 6.7 7.7 6.8 8.9 8.6 9.3 12.9 12.1 12.3 13.9 13.2 13.0
Private corporate sector 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 3.1 4.7 4.6 4.6 3.9 4.5 4.8 5.3
Public Sector 3.3 3.7 3.7 2.4 1.4 0.6 -0.3 -1.9 -2.2 -0.7 1.1 2.5
Administration 1.7 2.0 1.4 -1.2 -2.0 -3.3 -5.1 -6.1 -6.6 -5.7 -4.0 -3.0
Other 1.6 1.7 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.9 4.8 4.1 4.4 5.0 5.1 5.4
External Investment (current acc -1.1 -0.1 -1.4 -2.4 -1.5 -1.4 0.4 -0.7 0.7 1.3 1.8 -1.1
Total capital formation 16.2 17.7 19.8 22.9 24.8 26.6 28.5 26.7 25.2 27.7 29.8 33.2
Errors and Omissions -0.7 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.6 -0.8 0.7 2.0 3.2
Unadjusted capital formation  16.9 18.3 20.9 23.5 23.3 25.5 27.4 26.0 26.0 27.0 27.8 30.0
Public sector 7.6 8.2 9.9 10.2 8.9 7.7 7.4 7.6 7.6 6.8 7.1 8.0
Administration 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.4
Other public 6.2 6.8 8.3 8.6 7.5 6.2 5.5 5.9 6.0 4.8 5.0 5.6
Private crporate sector 2.6 2.4 4.1 4.4 5.9 8.6 7.1 6.3 6.1 6.3 7.5 9.1
Household sector 6.7 7.7 6.8 8.9 8.6 9.3 12.9 12.1 12.3 13.9 13.2 13.0
Valuables 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.4
Industry basis 17.3 18.8 22.6 23.8 22.1 27.3 27.4 26.0 26.0 27.0 27.8 30.0
Ariculture 34.0 25.2 17.4 12.1 7.9 8.6 5.1 5.4 3.6 4.9 5.4 6.1
Industry 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Services 17.3 18.8 22.6 23.8 22.1 28.1 27.4 26.0 26.0 27.0 27.8 30.0
Real estate 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4
Capital consumption allowances 6.7 7.3 8.9 9.7 9.9 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.2 10.4
Infrastucture Investment 4.1 4.2 4.8 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.7 6.1 5.2 5.5 5.4 6.2
Fixed Investment - asset 15.0 15.9 19.1 21.6 22.6 24.6 26.5 25.1 25.4 26.3 27.0 28.6
Fixed investment - industry 15.4 16.3 20.8 22.0 22.6 26.6 26.5 25.1 25.4 26.3 27.0 28.6
Source:  CSO (2006) and prior years.
Data include the revisions publised in the 1999-00 base year revisions, but total capital formation redefined to exclude valuables.